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Measuring Structural Economic 
Vulnerability in Africa*
A contribution to the Handbook of Africa and Economics 
Patrick Guillaumont
1. Introduction : The challenge of structural economic vulnerability for 
African development
In 2006, at a time when growth had clearly resumed in Africa, the opening speech 
at the irst African Economic Conference organized by the African Development 
Bank and AERC was entitled “Economic vulnerability, still a challenge for African 
growth” (Guillaumont 2007, 2008). Eight years on, including a global recession, 
food and fuel price spikes, and recent state crises in Africa—although in many 
countries growth has continued—vulnerability remains an issue to be addressed. 
Both cross-country econometrics and case studies have documented the impact 
of external, climatic, and political shocks on Africa’s growth, development, and 
poverty reduction (Ibid.; see also the chapter by Xubei Luo in this book). Al-
though some progress has been recorded in addressing economic vulnerability 
in Africa, it remains limited; moreover, the scope of vulnerability itself has been 
changing with the emergence of new -social and environmental- dimensions.
            .../...
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… /… Addressing the vulnerability of African economies requires an identification of its sources 
and determinants, including a conceptual clarification in view of the broadening scope. Section (2) 
proposes a conceptual framework where structural vulnerability is distinguished from general 
vulnerability, from physical vulnerability to climate change, and from state fragility as well. Section 
(3) analyzes the main features and evolution of structural economic vulnerability in Africa on the 
basis of an economic vulnerability index, highlighting not only higher structural economic 
vulnerability, but also a slower decline than in other developing economies. It then appears 
(section 4) that African economic vulnerability is reinforced by higher physical vulnerability to 
climate change, as shown by a specific index, and that Africa is the continent with the highest 
proportion of fragile states, suggesting a link between the various forms of vulnerability in Africa. 
Finally (section 5), measuring the structural vulnerability of African countries provides a useful tool 
for the international allocation of resources and not just to guide policies aimed at structural 
transformation and sustainable development. Adequately measured, structural vulnerability, as it is 
exogenous to current policy, may be a relevant criterion for the international allocation of 
concessional resources. 
2. A conceptual framework for measuring structural vulnerability in Africa 
Vulnerability, at the macro level (as at the micro level), is the risk for a country to be hampered by 
exogenous shocks, either natural (e.g. droughts) or external (e.g. fall in terms of trade).  Structural 
vulnerability includes only factors that do not depend on a country’s current policies, being entirely 
determined by exogenous and persistent factors; while general vulnerability also includes the effect 
of current and future policies, and therefore changes more rapidly (Guillaumont 1999, 2006). 
Size of the shocks, exposure and resilience 
There are three main sources of country vulnerability: the size of exogenous shocks ; the country’s 
exposure to those shocks (e.g. a small population size), and its capacity to cope with them, also 
named capacity to adapt or resilience. Structural vulnerability mainly results from the size of the 
shocks and the country’s exposure to them. General vulnerability also depends on resilience, more 
linked to current policy, and less to structural factors. There are indeed structural factors in the 
resilience of a country (such as its level of human capital and more generally its level of 
development or income per capita). However, most often these factors are not taken into account 
in the measurement of structural economic vulnerability, because, as we will see later on, they are 
considered separately. For instance, the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), an index of structural 
economic vulnerability devised by the United Nations for the identification of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), includes neither per capita income nor the level of human capital, as their levels 
are also and separately used as LDC identification criteria.  
The dynamic design of structural economic vulnerability 
A country’s structural economic vulnerability can be understood in a dynamic manner as the risk for 
this country to see its economic growth, and more generally its development rate, durably slowed 
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down by exogenous shocks, independently of its will. It is not only a risk of static loss of welfare. 
Thus, factors to be taken into account in the design and measurement of structural economic 
vulnerability should be likely to lower the rate of economic growth. An even broader meaning of 
structural economic vulnerability would include the risk that the country’s development become 
unsustainable, again because of shocks and factors independent of its will. Since the meaning of 
sustainability, as reflected in the preparatory works of the post-2015 agenda, now covers several 
dimensions—not only economic, but also environmental and socio-political—it is useful to 
examine together, but distinctly from structural economic vulnerability (using its original meaning 
mentioned above), vulnerability to climate change and what is commonly called state fragility. 
Structural economic vulnerability and physical vulnerability to climate change 
Indeed, some of the climatic sources of economic vulnerability that can be taken into account in 
the design of an index of economic vulnerability (as has been the case with the EVI—see below), 
are related to structural and permanent economic and geographical features, but not to climate 
change per se. Vulnerability to climate change stems from a risk of long-term change in geo-
physical conditions rather than to a growth handicap in the medium term. In other words, it is 
more physical than economic, and refers to a longer time horizon. As with structural economic 
vulnerability, and even more so, physical vulnerability to climate change is independent of present 
(and future) country policy. For this reason, its measurement should be based only on physical 
characteristics and trends, as is done in the “Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index” 
(PVCCI) set up at Ferdi.  
Leaving aside the resilience components, physical vulnerability to climate change, like structural 
economic vulnerability, should reflect two main components: shock intensity (due to climate 
change) and exposure (for instance the sea level rise and the share of areas likely to be flooded). 
The lack of socio-economic components in the design of a physical index of vulnerability to climate 
change is all the more legitimate given that any assessment of future adaptation capacity is highly 
uncertain.  
Blending the measurement of structural economic vulnerability and physical vulnerability to 
climate change is conceivable, but it would risk blurring information about the type of vulnerability 
a given country is facing. 
Structural economic vulnerability and state fragility 
A third dimension of vulnerability, but one that is highly dependent on the policy and current will 
of countries, is socio-political. State fragility is often presented as a form of vulnerability, although it 
is conceptually quite different.  State fragility is designed and identified from present policy and 
institutional factors (lack of state capacity, political will, and political legitimacy), with many 
changing definitions, most often from an assessment of policies and institutions through the World 
Bank’s CPIA (Country Policy and Institutions Assessment). On the contrary, structural economic 
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vulnerability is designed from factors supposed to be independent of policy (Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2009).  
Structural economic vulnerability significantly influences state fragility, as shown, for instance, by 
the impact of the UN’s EVI index on the CPIA (Guillaumont, Mc Gillivray, and Wagner, 2013). 
Accordingly, most of the countries identified as “fragile states” are also “least developed countries,” 
a category based on structural economic vulnerability (in addition to levels of income per capita 
and human capital). This holds for Africa, as explained later. 
Based on this conceptual framework, we now consider the measurement of structural economic 
vulnerability in Africa. 
3. Comparative levels and trends of structural economic vulnerability in Africa 
One approach to the analysis of economic vulnerability in Africa could be to consider growth 
volatility, an indicator that is widely used on account of its apparent simplicity and alleged impact 
on average growth (as evidenced by Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Growth volatility is generally 
proxied by the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita over a given 
number of years (9-10 years in the World Development Report 2014). However, this approach is not 
appropriate for the measurement of structural economic vulnerability for two reasons. The main 
one is that growth-rate instability may result not just from structural factors but also from transitory 
ones and domestic policy, dependent on the will of the country. Second, its measurement is highly 
sensitive to the length of the period covered—it should cover a minimum number of years to 
reflect a structural feature, but the longer the period, the higher the risk that the standard deviation 
simply reflects a trend change.1  
The UN Economic Vulnerability Index 
In order to examine the levels and trends of structural economic vulnerability in Africa, it is 
convenient to refer to the Economic Vulnerability Index set up by the UN’s Committee for 
Development Policy. The present structure of this index (initially introduced in 2000) was designed 
in 2005 (history and details in Guillaumont, 2009a, 2009b). It has been used for the triennial reviews 
of the list of LDCs in 2006, 2009, and, after a revision, in 2012 (on the scope and relevance of the 
revision, see Guillaumont, 2013). Its principle is to combine with equal weights a group of three 
sub-indices reflecting the intensity of recurrent shocks, natural and external, and a group of four-
five sub-indices reflecting exposure to those shocks. The structure of the index is shown in Graph 1 
in its 2006-09 and 2012 (revised) versions. The main change in the revised version was to add an 
“environmental” new component, the share of population living in low coastal areas, compensated 
by a reduced weight on population smallness.   
                                                          
1 According to the statistics of the World Development Report 2014, the average volatility of the GDP growth in the 1990s 
and 2000s has been, respectively, 5.8 and 3.6 in Africa and 3.4 and 3.3 in other developing countries.  
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Graph 1. The Economic Vulnerability Index, 2005-09 and 2011-12 versions compared 
 
A high average level in Africa, a slower decline 
Given our choice to examine separately structural economic vulnerability and physical vulnerability 
to climate change, we use the 2006-09 definition, all of whose components can be considered as 
potential contributors to slower growth. For that, we used new calculations of the EVI made at 
Ferdi on the basis of the 2006-09 definition (see Table 1). In the same way, we will consider the EVI’s 
evolution using a constant definition (Ferdi “Retrospective EVI”), either the 2006-09 one or the 2012 
one (references)2.  
From Table 1, it clearly appears that African countries have a (significantly) higher EVI than other 
developing economies (whatever the definition, 2005-09 or 2011-12), due both to the shock and 
the exposure components of the index with the 2006-09 definition, though only to the shock 
components with the 2012 definition (mainly because the share of population in low elevated 
coastal zones (LECZ) is noticably lower in Africa, due to the number of landlocked countries, where 
it is zero). When only Sub Sahara Africa is considered, the gap is even more important and 
observable for the exposure as well as for the shock components. Among African countries, the 
African LDCs, as a group, show an even higher structural economic vulnerability than other African 
countries. The same holds for the group African Landlocked, but to a lesser extent.  
Has the structural-vulnerability gap between African countries and other developing countries 
been shrinking or widening? The level of EVI measured according to a constant definition has been 
declining in African countries, evidencing some structural change. But the decrease in EVI observed 
                                                          
2 Several other improvements could be brought to the measurement of the EVI, in particular in the way by which the 
components are averaged (presently an arithmetic average) (see Guillaumont 2009a, 2009b) 
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between 2000 and 2011 has been deeper in non- African countries than in African ones, widening 
the structural gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world. In landlocked African 
countries, there has been no decrease, in spite of rapid population growth, a factor dampening the 
impact of small size. 
Table 1. Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI): level in 2011 and change from 2000 to 2011. 
Africa and African subgroups compared to other developing countries 
Country Category 
Components of EVI 
2011 
EVI 2011 
(2011 
definition) 
EVI 2011  
(2006-2009 
definition) 
EVI 2011 
-EVI 2000 
(2006-2009 
definitionx) 
Exposure Shock 
All Developing 
Countries(130) 
37.2 36.3 36.7 37.2 -3.8 
All African Countries(53) 36.8 41.5 38.9 39.7 -2.6 
Sub Saharan Africa 
Countries(48) 
38.8 43.0 40.6 41.2 -2.6 
African LDCs(33) 39.9 47.8 43.9 43.1 -3.1 
African Landlocked LDCs(11) 38.7 48.0 43.3 42.6 0.2 
x  The calculation of change (EVI 2011-2000) has been done without 3 countries: Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Timor-Leste 
because data for these countries are not available in 2000. 
Heterogeneity in vulnerability sources and in country levels 
Unsurprisingly, there are large differences among African countries, particularly obvious when 
looking at the EVI’s components, indicating the heterogeneity of sources of structural vulnerability 
among the African countries (see Table 2 and Appendix 1). 
As for the shock index’s components, when all African countries are considered, the three 
component sub-indices are higher in Africa than in other developing countries, the instability of 
exports (of goods and services) being dramatically higher. When only SSA countries are considered, 
the number of victims of disasters is significantly higher, while the instability of agricultural 
production is no longer higher. For only African LDCs and for only landlocked African countries, the 
three sub-indices are even higher, the former evidencing the highest average for export instability, 
the latter for the victims of disasters. At the country level, the highest levels are shown by oil 
exporters (for which export concentration is high, as well as the instability of exports) and by some 
agricultural countries (Eritrea and the Gambia). 
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Table 2. Components of the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) in 2011. Africa and African 
subgroups compared to other developing countries 
Country 
Category 
Components of EVI 2011 
Exposure Index Shock Index 
Population Remoteness 
Export  
concentration 
Share of 
Agriculture 
Share of 
LECZ 
Instability 
of 
Agricultural 
production 
Instability 
of Export 
Victims 
of 
disasters 
All 
Developing 
Countries(130) 
42.8 55.9 33.7 27.3 19.5 24.1 30.1 60.8 
All African 
Countries(53) 
39.2 55.7 40.1 40.3 12.5 25.1 38.4 61.6 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
Countries(48) 
40.9 61.1 41.2 42.9 11.4 24.4 39.4 66.0 
African 
LDCs(33) 
39.1 59.3 42.8 52.7 13.6 26.3 48.0 69.1 
African 
Landlocked 
LDCs(11) 
33.8 72.3 46.0 51.5 0.0 27.8 44.5 75.0 
 
As for the exposure sub-indices, when all African countries are considered, only the export 
concentration and the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in GDP are significantly higher 
than in other developing countries, while the share of LECZ is of course significantly lower. When 
only SSA countries are considered, remoteness is also higher. For only landlocked African countries 
(and, to a lesser extent, African LDCs), the same three sub-indices are even higher, while the 
smallness of population is lower, and the LECZ component is nil. Finally the highest levels of the 
exposure index are observed in small coastal or island countries (Guinea Bissau, Comoros, Sao 
Tome and Principe, and the Gambia), and the lowest levels in the three Maghreb countries. 
These measures should be taken as proxy indicators of structural economic vulnerability, likely to 
be discussed and improved in their composition and calculation. 
Structural economic vulnerability is even higher when considered more broadly 
It should be remembered that the assessment of structural economic vulnerability through the EVI, 
as it is presently designed, can only give a partial view, since it does not take into account the 
structural components of resilience, which are numerous and depend on the overall level of 
development. They are considered separately for the identification of the LDCs through the Human 
Assets Index (HAI), a composite index of health and education indicators, and the level of income 
per capita. Since the levels of human capital and income per capita are on average lower in Africa 
than in other developing countries, this reinforces the diagnosis of higher structural economic 
vulnerability in Africa.   In this respect, it seems clear that the African countries with the lowest 
income and human capital face very high structural vulnerability: these poor and vulnerable 
countries, the category that the term “least developed countries” tries to capture, are more likely 
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than other to be “caught in a trap,” (unless they receive special support (and/or achieve bold 
reforms) (Guillaumont, 2009a)). The risk of getting trapped, as supposed in the LDCs identification 
criteria, results from the conjunction of structural economic vulnerability (stricto sensu) and low 
human capital in countries with low income per capita. For this reason, these three criteria are 
taken into account separately, in a complementary manner, for the identification of the LDCs. It is 
conceivable to aggregate the EVI and the HAI in a composite index of structural handicaps (a 
structural economic vulnerability lato sensu), allowing for limited substitutability between them to 
remain consistent with the initial hypothesis of complementarity...or even to combine these two 
indicators with the smallness of income per capita, in order to obtain an index of “least 
development” (see details in Guillaumont, 2009a).  
It then remains to distinguish between the African LDCs, most of them are small or medium 
population countries (except Ethiopia and Tanzania), and the other African countries. Some of 
those countries may appear to be vulnerable with regard to their EVI, but not with respect to their 
level of income per capita (mainly the case of oil exporters) or their level of human capital. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Economic Vulnerability Index may not seem to capture the new 
forms of vulnerability evidenced by the political events linked to the “Arab Spring” in North Africa. 
This vulnerability, easier to measure ex post, for instance through its impact on the instability of 
exports, does not fit the definition of structural vulnerability adopted above, since it mainly results 
from policy and institutional factors. It rather reflects a state fragility. 
4. Structural economic vulnerability and other measures of vulnerability in Africa: 
climate change and state fragility 
In the introduction of this chapter, we juxtaposed structural economic vulnerability with two other 
forms of vulnerability, physical vulnerability to climate change and state fragility. For both there are 
attempts at measurement, which leads, now, to consider two issues. First, how structural economic 
vulnerability in Africa, measured with a medium-term horizon, is enhanced in the long term by 
physical vulnerability to climate change, according to the “Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change 
Index (PVCCI)”and what are the main sources and patterns of vulnerability to climate change in 
Africa? Second, do African countries suffer from state fragility, according to current assessments, 
and is this fragility the result of structural vulnerability?   
Africa vulnerability to climate change.  
Because it is highly controversial to assess the likely socio-economic consequences of climate 
change, there is a rationale for setting up an index of vulnerability relying solely on physical 
components. As shown in Graph 2 below, this index combines the physical impact of two kinds of 
shocks, the progressive shocks, namely the sea level rise and the aridification, and the 
intensification of recurrent shocks, in temperature and rainfall, respectively (see details in 
Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011). For these four kinds of shocks, we combine an indicator of the 
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size of the shock with an indicator of the country exposure to the shock. Moreover, to better 
capture the vulnerability to any kind of shock linked to climate change we use a quadratic average 
of the main components instead of an arithmetic one. 
Graph 2. The “Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index” (PVCCI) 
 
Source: Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011  
In Table 3, we give the average value of this index and its main components for the same groups of 
countries as the EVI. 
Table 3. The Physical Vunerability to Climate Change Index: Africa and African subgroups 
compared to other developing countries 
Country 
Category 
Arithmetic average Quadratic average 
Progressive  
shocks 
Increasing 
recurrent 
Shocks 
PVCCI Progressive  
shocks 
Increasing 
recurrent 
shocks 
PVCCI 
Developing 
Countries (118) 
24.4 47.9 36.2 32.4 48.9 42.5 
African 
Countries(53) 
26.2 49.4 37.8 35.9 50.1 44.7 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
Countries(48) 
24.7 50.5 37.6 33.8 51.2 44.3 
African LDCs(33) 24.2 51.4 37.8 33.4 52.3 44.8 
African 
Landlocked (15) 
26.1 51.2 38.7 36.9 52.1 46.1 
Risks related to progressive shocks Risks related to the intensification  
of recurrent shocks 
Flooding due to sea level
rise
(1/4)
Increasing aridity 
(1/4)
Rainfall
(1/4)
Temperature 
(1/4)
Trend in
-temperature(1/16)
- rainfall (1/16)
Share of dry 
lands
(1/8)
Trend in rainfall 
instability
(1/8)
Trend in 
temperature 
instability (1/8)
Share of flood
areas
(1/8)
Size of likely rise 
in sea level
(1/8)
Rainfall
instability
(1/8)
Temperature 
Instability
(1/8)
Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index
PVCCI
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On average, all African countries, as well as Sub-Saharan countries, have a higher average PVCCI 
than the other developing countries (Table 3), a difference more significantly demonstrated when 
a quadratic average is used, instead of the arithmetic one. The difference increases when only 
African landlocked countries are considered. This higher level of African countries is due both to 
the impact of the increasing intensity of recurrent shocks (weighted by corresponding exposure 
indices) and to the impact of progressive shocks.   
As for the risk associated with progressive shocks (see Tables 3 and 4), there is first a rather low 
impact of the sea level rise in Africa, since Africa includes very few small islands (more threatened 
by this trend) and many landlocked countries. But this lower vulnerability to sea level rise is 
compensated by a greater vulnerability to “increasing aridity” (7 points difference compared to all 
developing countries), itself due to a stronger (increasing) trend in temperature (rather than to the 
(decreasing) trend in rainfall), combined with a larger share of drylands. Finally, when an arithmetic 
average is used, the index of the risk of progressive shocks is not significantly different in Africa and 
in other developing countries, because of these two opposing effects, but becomes so when a 
quadratic average is used.  
As for the index of increasing recurrent shocks, the higher average level for all African countries is 
due to the trend of rainfall instability, from a high initial level. For African LDCs or African Lanlocked 
countries, it is also due to the intensification of temperature instability. 
Table 4. Components of the Vulnerability to Climate Change Index: Africa and African 
subgroups compared to other developing countries 
Country Category 
PVCCI, risk related to 
Progressive  shocks 
Intensification of recurrent 
shocks in 
Sea Level Rise 
Increasing 
aridity 
Rainfall  Temperature 
Developing Countries (118) 5.3 43.5 42.6 53.3 
African Countries (53) 2.0 50.3 45.8 53.0 
Sub Saharan Africa Countries 
(48) 
2.1 47.3 47.2 53.8 
African LDCs (33) 1.3 47.1 47.4 55.5 
African Landlocked LDCs (11) 0 52.2 46.4 56.0 
Number of countries between brackets 
The index exhibits a large heterogeneity in the levels and types of vulnerability among 
countries (see Appendix 2). The ten most vulnerable African countries with regard to the quadratic 
PCCVI are Sudan, Namibia, Mauritania, Niger, Botswana, Somalia, the Gambia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
and Burkina Faso. This is generally due to a high level of several components of the index. The 
ranking is sensitive to the kind of average used, due to the fact that the sources and profile of 
vulnerability differ from one country to another. The risk of “progressive shocks” is, for some 
African countries (Botswana, Chad, and Mali) , due to an increase of aridity,  at the highest level in 
the world, while some African countries also face the other type of progressive shock, the sea level 
rise (Senegal or the Gambia). The “risk of intensification of recurrent shocks,” high on average for 
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African countries, is at the highest level for some African countries (Burundi, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola are among the ten developing countries at 
the highest level in the world). Thus, although many African countries seem to be highly vulnerable 
to climate change for physical reasons, the precise reason or channel of this (physical) vulnerability 
may differ significantly from one country to another. 
It would be conceivable to combine the PCCVI with the EVI measure (taking its 2005-09 definition, 
to avoid partial overlapping through the share of population living in low coastal zones, the new 
EVI component introduced in 2001). Due to the different horizons of EVI and PCCVI, the weight 
given to each of them would reflect some time preference. With equal weights, the highest 
averages would be obtained by Sudan, the Gambia and Eritrea. Without calculating such a 
heterogeneous average, a picture of the two vulnerabilities can be given by representing the two 
indices on the same graph, as done in Appendix 3, where the oblique line corresponds to the 40 
percent of countries with the highest average combined index.  If African countries are compared 
to other developing countries with regard to this combined index, they evidence a significantly 
higher index (42.2 versus 37.9), even higher in Sub Saharan Africa (42.7) and African LDCs (43.9) or 
African landlocked (43.7). Fourteen African countries are among the twenty developing countries 
with the highest combined index.    
State fragility 
State fragility seems to be on the opposite side of structural (or physical) vulnerability, since it is 
designed from an assessment of present policy, as explained above. Among the various (and often 
changing) definitions of “Fragile States” and measurements of “state fragility” (see Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2011), let us take the list of Fragile States used at the OECD in 2013, and 
presented as a list harmonized between OECD and the multilateral development banks. For 2012, it 
includes 47 countries, 27 of which are African countries, all south of the Sahara, all but four of 
which are LDCs. It is worth noting that it did not include Mali, Burkina Faso, Libya, Egypt—showing 
how volitile and uninformative it can be in terms of the real political risks faced by the countries. It 
is more a tool for designing curative measures, than to prevent the occurrence of failing states. 
The source of this paradox, well exemplified by the case of African countries, is to be found in the 
way in which the list is set up.  Roughly speaking, the Fragile States are countries with a CPIA  
(World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) lower than 3.2 (on a scale from 1 to 6) or 
with UN peace-keeping operations. 
Until recently, Mali was not considered as a Fragile State, because, due to policy improvement, its 
CPIA was above 3.2, although it was highly vulnerable; Niger, also highly vulnerable, is no longer 
considered “fragile,” also thanks to an improved CPIA. In fact, the category of Fragile State has been 
introduced to solve the problem met by the multilateral development banks in the allocation of 
their aid, based on so-called “performance.” The strict application of “performance based 
allocation” (PBA) appeared to require an exception for the states considered by various names as 
“fragile”; below a given CPIA threshold an exception to the strict PBA rule was applied. Without 
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discussing here the consistency of the rule and its exceptions (see Guillaumont, Guillaumont 
Jeanneney and Wagner, 2011, Guillaumont, 2012), let us note from a methodological point of view, 
it suggests the built-in weakness of the category of Fragile States. State fragility is indeed a huge 
issue, particularly in Africa, but it necessitates a qualitative assessment, allowing observers and 
donors to adapt their diagnostic and support, rather than a quantitative measurement (Collier, 
2013). On the contrary, structural economic vulnerability, as well as physical vulnerability to climate 
change, can be roughly measured, and legitimately used for international allocation of resources, 
as we see now. 
5. The measurement of structural vulnerability as a tool for designing international 
policies towards Africa  
The measurement of structural vulnerabilities through indices such as EVI or PVCCI is useful, first, in 
the design of policies aimed at tackling their main sources, which, as we have seen, differ according 
by country. From that perspective, the components of the indices are more important than the 
composite index. For another use of such a measurement, the international allocation of 
concessional resources, the composite index is needed and matters more.  
Let us first consider the allocation of ODA. As already noted, PBA has been challenged by the 
Fragile-state cases. Actually, the challenge is broader. We had previously argued that the allocation 
of international development assistance should take into account the structural economic 
vulnerability of recipient countries, for several reasons (Guillaumont, 2009b, 2010b, 2011, 
Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Wagner, 2010). One such reason is equity. Taking into 
account the structural handicaps to development is a way by which development opportunities 
are made more equal between countries. At the same time, it increases the consistency of the 
reference to “performance,” which in its true meaning cannot be assessed without a consideration 
of these handicaps.  Moreover, taking them into account is favorable to aid effectiveness, which has 
been shown to be higher in more vulnerable countries (thanks to the stabilizing impact of aid) (see, 
for instance, Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2009, Collier and Goderis, 2009). Finally, it allows for 
treating state fragility in an integrated framework, preventively as well as curatively. All these 
reasons particularly apply in the African context. 
This view has been supported by a recent resolution of the UN General Assembly (A/C.2/67/L.53 of 
4 December 2012 on the smooth transition of graduating LDCs), inviting the “development 
partners to consider least developed countries indicators, gross national income per capita, the 
human assets index, and the economic vulnerability index as part of their criteria for allocating 
official development assistance”. This has been recently implemented by the European 
Commission in programming the allocation of European assistance to ACP countries (Africa, 
Caribbean, Pacific) for the coming years. In this context, the measurement of structural economic 
vulnerability becomes particularly important. It may point to the need for a new refinement of the 
EVI. 
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A similar argument can be advanced for the allocation of assistance for adaptation to climate 
change. It is indeed legitimate to consider vulnerability to climate change as a relevant allocation 
criterion (Guillaumont and Simonet, 2011; Wheeler, 2011; Birdsall and De Nevers, 2012). The main 
reason is that the recipient developing countries are not responsible for the physical vulnerability 
they face. From that perspective, the PVCCI, since it does not depend on recipient policy, may be a 
relevant allocation criterion. Of course, as previously noted for the EVI, a refinement of the PCCVI 
index (ongoing at Ferdi) may be useful for this aim. Moreover, other allocation criteria are needed 
alongside, such as the level of income per capita, as a complementary indicator of need, and an 
indicator of the likely effectiveness of assistance.  
Thus, in both cases (ODA and concessional resources for adaptation), it is clear that a structural or 
physical measure of vulnerability is a relevant allocation criterion. It also appears that structural 
resilience, not captured through the components of the EVI or the PVCCI, should also be taken into 
account through indicators such as per capita income or the level of human capital. While weak 
structural resilience, as a part of structural vulnerability, should lead to a higher allocation, a low 
resilience due to policy, if measurable, would act in the opposite direction, for reasons of 
effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
This chapter tried to present the main methodological issues involved in the measurement of 
structural economic vulnerability in Africa. This meant designing a conceptual framework capable 
of disentangling (i) “structural” vulnerability from vulnerability linked to present policies, and (ii) 
medium-term structural economic vulnerability from long-term physical vulnerability to climate 
change. In this framework, there are many options for measurement, depending on the expected 
use. Although the indices presented here may be considered as tentative, they highlight both 
Africa’s high average level of structural or physical vulnerability and the strong heterogeneity of its 
sources across African countries. While the diversity of sources should be taken into account in the 
design of the domestic policies addressing structural vulnerability, synthetic measures given by 
composite indices of structural economic vulnerability and of physical vulnerability to climate 
change should be used as criteria in the international allocation of development assistance and of 
concessional adaptation resources, respectively. 
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Appendix 1. Level of the Economic Vulnerability Index in 2011 calculated at Ferdi with new 
data according to the UNCDP 2011 definition 
EVI 2011 (2011 definition) 
Country_Name LDCs 
Landlocke
d 
FS 
Exposure 
Index 
Shock 
Index 
EVI 2011  
Change(EVI201
1-EVI2000) 
Valu
e 
Ran
k 
Valu
e 
Ran
k 
Valu
e 
Ran
k 
Algeria       13.2 2 33.1 19 23.1 6 -0.9 
Angola x   x 38.1 27 61.3 46 49.7 44 -1.5 
Benin x     37.9 25 31.7 16 34.8 18 -10.1 
Botswana   x   47.1 46 34.5 21 40.8 31 -4.3 
Burkina Faso x x   35.0 21 38.8 26 36.9 25 -7.4 
Burundi x x x 42.2 37 65.6 48 53.9 48 2.3 
Côte d'Ivoire       28.4 10 43.3 35 22.3 4 1.4 
Cameroon     x 27.8 9 18.4 3 23.1 5 -2.7 
Cape Verde       43.1 39 27.2 10 35.1 19 -3.2 
Central African 
Republic 
x x x 43.4 41 19.1 4 31.3 13 -1.4 
Chad x x x 37.7 24 74.3 50 56.0 50 15.9 
Comoros x   x 57.3 52 38.5 25 47.9 42 -7.8 
Congo       38.4 30 30.1 15 34.3 17 -2.4 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
x   x 29.7 14 45.7 38 37.7 27 -2.0 
Djibouti x     48.1 48 44.1 37 46.1 40 -11.3 
Egypt       21.2 4 15.6 2 18.4 2 -6.5 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
x     43.1 40 41.1 30 42.1 33 -9.4 
Eritrea x   x 29.3 12 88.7 53 59.0 51   
Ethiopia x   x 30.1 17 32.6 18 31.4 14   
Gabon       43.7 43 33.7 20 38.7 29 2.5 
Gambia x     49.8 50 84.9 52 67.3 53 17.4 
Ghana       29.8 15 29.2 13 29.5 12 -17.9 
Guinea x   x 34.6 20 20.3 5 27.4 10 1.0 
Guinea-Bissau x   x 58.0 53 61.6 47 59.8 52 -1.8 
Kenya     x 24.8 6 28.8 12 26.8 8 -2.7 
Lesotho x x   44.6 44 39.8 27 42.2 34 -2.1 
Liberia x   x 49.3 49 53.6 43 51.5 46 -12.5 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
      26.4 7 41.3 31 33.8 16 3.7 
Madagascar x     33.6 18 40.1 28 36.8 24 6.2 
Malawi x x x 41.6 34 54.5 44 48.0 43 -4.0 
Mali x x   38.1 28 32.5 17 35.3 20 1.3 
Mauritania x     43.6 42 47.8 39 45.7 39 8.9 
Mauritius       42.1 36 14.7 1 28.4 11 -10.5 
Morocco       12.5 1 20.8 6 16.7 1 -5.0 
Mozambique x     39.6 32 51.1 40 45.4 38 -2.0 
Namibia       37.9 26 37.1 24 37.5 26 0.0 
Niger x x x 34.1 19 41.7 32 37.9 28 -5.0 
Nigeria     x 29.9 16 42.7 33 36.3 22 -6.4 
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Rwanda x x x 38.8 31 51.2 41 45.0 37 -4.4 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
x     55.8 51 30.0 14 42.9 36 -13.7 
Senegal x     35.8 23 37.0 23 36.4 23 -2.8 
Seychelles       47.2 47 35.8 22 41.5 32 -0.7 
Sierra Leone x   x 41.0 33 59.1 45 50.1 45 0.5 
Somalia x   x 42.8 38 51.2 42 47.0 41 -14.3 
South Africa       23.5 5 24.5 8 24.0 7 0.4 
Sudan x   x 29.5 13 75.2 51 52.4 47 0.3 
Swaziland   x   44.7 45 40.5 29 42.6 35 0.0 
Togo x   x 38.3 29 28.8 11 33.5 15 -5.4 
Tunisia       16.5 3 22.7 7 19.6 3 -5.7 
Uganda x x x 28.6 11 42.8 34 35.7 21 -12.2 
United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
x     26.8 8 26.9 9 26.9 9 -2.8 
Zambia x x   42.0 35 67.2 49 54.6 49 9.4 
Zimbabwe   x x 35.4 22 43.5 36 39.5 30 2.5 
 
Appendix 2. Level of the quadratic Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index calculated 
by Ferdi and rank of countries. 
PVCCI  
Country_Name 
LDC
s Landlocke
d 
FS 
Progressive 
Shocks 
Recurrent 
Shocks 
PVCCI 
Value Rank Value Rank 
Valu
e 
Ran
k 
Algeria       55.3 46 48.1 21 51.8 38 
Angola x   x 28.2 25 60.3 48 47.1 32 
Benin x     24.9 21 48.0 19 38.2 15 
Botswana   x   60.9 52 50.3 28 55.8 49 
Burkina Faso x x   50.7 37 56.5 43 53.7 44 
Burundi x x x 23.3 19 72.0 53 53.5 43 
Côte d'Ivoire       16.6 4 43.9 9 33.2 4 
Cameroon     x 20.0 12 48.0 20 36.8 10 
Cape Verde       50.6 36 50.2 27 50.4 37 
Central African Republic x x x 14.9 1 44.1 10 32.9 3 
Chad x x x 52.4 39 53.4 36 52.9 42 
Comoros x   x 29.4 28 29.0 1 29.2 1 
Congo       15.9 2 51.5 31 38.1 14 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo x   x 18.2 9 43.5 8 33.4 5 
Djibouti x     53.5 43 38.9 5 46.8 30 
Egypt       54.5 45 42.6 7 48.9 36 
Equatorial Guinea x     18.1 7 47.1 17 35.7 8 
Eritrea x   x 50.1 35 46.4 14 48.3 34 
Ethiopia x   x 35.4 30 45.5 11 40.8 21 
Gabon       17.5 5 52.3 32 39.0 17 
Gambia  x     51.8 38 58.0 46 55.0 47 
Ghana       18.9 10 48.9 23 37.0 12 
Guinea x   x 20.9 13 53.0 35 40.3 19 
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Guinea-Bissau x   x 22.3 17 62.4 51 46.8 31 
Kenya     x 44.9 32 46.8 15 45.9 28 
Lesotho x x   22.0 16 49.6 25 38.4 16 
Liberia x   x 19.0 11 47.2 18 35.9 9 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya       58.3 50 46.8 15 52.9 41 
Madagascar x     22.8 18 53.8 37 41.3 22 
Malawi x x x 25.6 22 51.4 30 40.6 20 
Mali x x   52.6 40 51.1 29 51.8 39 
Mauritania x     56.0 47 57.3 44 56.6 51 
Mauritius       16.5 3 39.3 6 30.1 2 
Morocco       53.5 44 31.2 3 43.8 26 
Mozambique x     26.9 23 55.3 41 43.5 25 
Namibia       61.0 53 52.6 34 57.0 52 
Niger x x x 56.9 48 55.5 42 56.2 50 
Nigeria     x 33.8 29 52.6 33 44.2 27 
Rwanda x x x 22.0 15 54.6 40 41.6 23 
Sao Tome and Principe x     18.2 8 71.3 52 52.0 40 
Senegal x     53.3 41 54.2 39 53.8 45 
Seychelles       29.3 27 53.8 37 43.3 24 
Sierra Leone x   x 24.6 20 46.1 13 37.0 11 
Somalia x   x 53.3 42 57.4 45 55.4 48 
South Africa       47.4 33 50.0 26 48.7 35 
Sudan x   x 58.2 49 62.1 50 60.2 53 
Swaziland   x   39.2 31 29.3 2 34.6 6 
Togo x   x 17.9 6 46.1 12 34.9 7 
Tunisia       59.0 51 31.2 3 47.2 33 
Uganda x x x 21.9 14 48.9 24 37.9 13 
United Rep. of Tanzania x     28.8 26 48.5 22 39.9 18 
Zambia x x   28.2 24 58.5 47 45.9 29 
Zimbabwe   x x 47.7 34 60.7 49 54.6 46 
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